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1952] NOTES
expelled, he is deprived of these rights and therefore entitled to
the protection of the court. To further protect the union member,
a few courts have required the provisions in union constitutions
and by-laws to be consistent with public policy 13 and natural
justice.14 Thus, whenever a member is expelled because of a
provision which is opposed to public policy, the courts will render
their protection. 15 Under any of these theories, the judicial rem-
edy is usually reinstatement in the union and damages caused
by the improper expulsion.' 6 Once the court has found an, im-
proper expulsion, it holds the unionliable to the injured party
for any damages sustained as a result of the wrong committed. 7
If wrongful expulsion was in bad faith or malicious, the courts
in some instances have also awarded punitive damages.'8 In some
cases unwarranted discharge of union members by union officials
has been prevented in advance through injunctive process. 19
The preceding not only illustrates the jurisdiction, but also
the power and duty of the courts to review and rule upon matters
pertaining to reinstatement of discharged union members in a
union and damages for wrongful expulsion therefrom.
Darrell Daniel DesOrmeaux
MINERAL RIGHTS-OIL ROYALTIES As FRUITS
The appellee received royalty payments from oil and gas
leases, entered into prior to his marriage, upon his separate prop-
13. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
14. Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N.Y. Supp. I (Sup. Ct. 1919).
15. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
16. See cases cited notes 5 and 10, supra.
17. See cases cited note 5, supra; Johnson v. International of the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 54 Nev. 332, 16 P. 2d 658 (1932).
18. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers,
116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905); Grand International Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Walker v. Grand
Int'l Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E. 146 (1938);
Kinane v. Fray, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 Atl. 724 (1933).
19. Otis Loney v. Wilson Storage and Transfer Co., 8 Labor Cases 66,663
(1944). Subsequent to the decision in the subject case the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in Jones v. Hansen, 57 So. 2d 224 (La. 1952), affirmed the dismissal
of a suit for compensatory and exemplary damages against a number of
members of a local union (including one charged with having acted in his
official capacity as secretary) for allegedly having wrongfully disciplined the
plaintiffs to their monetary damage in employment relationships. The
defense was apparently not urged nor did the court consider the question
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erty. Subsequent to his marriage and upon additional separate
property, wherein no oil had yet been discovered or produced,
he granted similar mineral leases, and received from some a
bonus or portion of the original consideration and from others a
part of the annual rent to keep the lease in effect. The state board
of tax appeals ordered the appellee to pay additional taxes for
the years 1946 and 1947 on the ground that the income received
from the above leases and for the years in question was separate
income for tax purposes. The civil district court reversed. Held,
judgment of the district court affirmed. Royalties and bonuses
from mineral leases on the husband's separate property, paid
during the existence of the marriage, are civil fruits or rents and
fall into community of acquets and gains. Milling v. Collector of
Revenue, 57 So. 2d 679 (La. 1952).
This note will discuss, first, the holding itself, followed by at
least a cursory glance at several ancillary problems and consid-
erations which suggest themselves as a result of the decision.
The cases most often cited as authority for the statement that
royalties and bonuses are rents are Logan v. State Gravel Com-
pany' and Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v.
Pure Oil Company.2 In the Logan case the court decided that the
contract under which the defendant was allowed to remove sand
and gravel was one of lease, and the fact that the word "royalty"
was used instead of "rent" was held to be inconsequential. The
Pure Oil case cited the Logan case and held that royalties due
under a mineral lease were rents and that it made no. difference
that the royalties were one-eighth of the oil produced since,
under Article 2671 of the Civil Code,8 rent could consist of a
certain portion of the fruits from the thing leased.
of exclusiveness of the board's jurisdiction to hear and redress wrongdoing
on the part of the union which may conceivably have constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
1. Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925). See also
Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 173 La. 313, 137 So. 46, 82 A.L.R. 1264 (1931);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 751,
170 So. 785 (1936); Parker v. Ohio Oil Co., 191 La. 896, 186 So. 604 (1939);
Robinson v. Horton, 197 La. 919, 2 So. 2d 647 (1941).
2. Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee Dist. v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La.
801, 120 So. 373 (1928).
3. Art. 2671, La. Civil Code of 1870, says that the price in a lease "may
consist in a certain quantity of commodities, or even in a portion of the
fruits yielded by the thing leased." (Italics supplied.) Attention is directed
to subsequent portions of this paper wherein the intention that fruits be
something capable of production and reproduction is shown.
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The leading case stating the contrary view is Elder v. Ellerbe,4
in which the defendant sought to retain royalties on the ground
that he was a good faith possessor. The court held that oil is not
a fruit, relying on French authorities5 to the effect that "fruits
must be things which are born and reborn of the soil." The first 6
and principal case on all fours with the facts of the Milling case
is Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray,7 decided in the
United States Court of Appeals. Judge Lee, speaking for the
court, stated that an oil and gas lease contains elements of both
an ordinary lease and a sale, that the word "profits" in Article
2402 of the Civil Code" is an erroneous translation from the
French text and should be read as "fruits," but that oil in the
earth is not a "fruit." It is instead a part of the realty itself, and
therefore royalties and bonuses received from these leases are
not rents in the usual sense of the word and are not "civil fruits."
One case, Wright v. Imperial Oil and Gas Products Com-
pany,9 seems to fall somewhere between these extremes. The
court discussed both the Logan case and the Pure Oil case and
stated, ". . . while... [in those cases] the Court treated royalty
as rent, it does not follow that when the question of who is liable
for a severance tax arises, the Court will not examine particularly
into the facts, involving liability for the tax, and rule that the
owner of the royalty is liable for the tax thereon." This would
appear to support the view that "royalties" are not to be classi-
fied as "rents" for all purposes.
This early jurisprudence becomes vastly important when
considered in the light of Article 2402 of the Civil Code and the
various decisions which have firmly established that rents from
the separate property of the husband received during the com-
4. Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 995, 66 So. 337, 338 (1914). See also Jack-
son v. Shaw, 151 La. 795, 92 So. 339 (1922); Wright v. Imperial Oil & Gas
Products Co., 177 La. 482, 148 So: 685 (1933); Gulf Refining Co. v. Garrett,
209 La. 674, 25 So. 2d 329 (1945). The Garrett case was subsequently set aside
when a rehearing was granted and the case remanded. 209 La. 674, 702, 25
So. 2d 329 (1946).
5. 1 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Precis de Droit Civil 754 (14 ed. 1926).
6. United States v. Harang, 165 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1947), was on all
fours with the instant case except the plaintiff was married prior to the tax
years in question. Held, oil royalties from the husband's separate property
constitute separate income for tax purposes.
7. 159 F. 2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947).
8. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870: "This partnership or community
consists of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the admin-
istration and the enjoyment .. " (Italics supplied.)




munity are profits and therefore belong to the community of
acquets and gains.
Perhaps the largest hurdle to be cleared in order to accept
the idea that royalties are rents or civil fruits is the very physical
nature of oil and gas. It is elementary that they were deposited
in the earth countless centuries ago, and as a physical fact they
constitute part of the land. This fact is recognized in Louisiana's
conservation laws,' our allowance for depletion," and again in
our severance tax law.'2 It is apparent that the product now
being withdrawn will not be reproduced within the lifetime of
any living man, if at all. It is true that the court in the instant
decision held royalty to be a civil and not a natural fruit. How-
ever, it is submitted that the physical nature of oil and gas
removes royalties from the class of civil fruits as well as that of
natural fruits.
Article 545 of the Civil Code says, "Civil fruits are rents' of
real property, the interest of money, and annuities." When a
house is rented and rent is paid, even though there is gradual
depreciation, there is no piecemeal removal of the thing itself
as there is in an oil and gas lease. The situation would be analo-
gous if the tenant were allowed to pay rent to his landlord in
the form of so many feet of lumber, which he had taken from
the rented house. It is true that in many instances royalties
have been considered as rents under Louisiana law,'8 but there
are some royalties which are not considered to be rents.' 4 In
the instant case reference is made to the case of King v. Harper,15
wherein it was held that rent (by whatever name called) is a
certain profit in money, provisions, chattels, or labor issuing out
of the land and tenements in retribution for the use. (Italics
supplied.) The only difficulty is that the "use" now under con-
sideration amounts to a full and complete consumption of the
thing.
The lease is the legal vehicle which is commonly used to
deal with oil and gas royalties. But likening royalties to rent for
the convenience of using the lease pattern has nothing to do, with
the substantive rights of the parties. Under Louisiana law the
10. La. R.S. (1950) 30:1-63.
11. La. R.S. (1950) 47:55, 158(C).
12. La. R.S. (1950) 47:631 et seq.
13. See cases cited supra note 1.
14. See cases cited supra note 4.
15. 33 La. Ann. 496 (1881).
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owners of mineral contracts may mortgage them.'6 They may also
be pledged, 17 and in one case it was held to be a waste of the land
for the mortgagee to produce oil under a lease granted subse-
quent to the mortgage.'8 All of this simply points to the fact
that a real right is being dealt with.19 When a mineral "lease,"
as distinguished from a predial lease, is granted, it amounts to
an actual alienation for all intents and purposes.20 The conse-
quence of carrying the analogy between a mineral lease and a
predial lease too far is seen in at least two instances of clear
expression by the legislature. In 1936, in deciding the case of
Gulf Refining Company v. Glassell,2' the court said that the lessee
of oil and gas leases received only a personal right. Immediately
following this decision, the legislature, by Act 205 of 1938,22 stated
that the right was a real one. In two cases which followed, Tyson
v. Surf Oil Company23 and Payne v. Walmsley (a case from the
court of appeal) ,24 it was held that the above statute did not
change any substantive rights, but was procedural only. In 1950,
at the Second Extra Session,25 the legislature said that the act
was to be considered substantive as well as procedural.
Several collateral questions which have suggested themselves
as a result of the Milling decision are:
Usufructuary Rights. Since the principal case classified royal-
ties as civil fruits, will such royalties go to a usufructuary? The
16. La. R.S. (1950) 30:109.
17. La. R.S. (1950) 9:4301-4304.
18. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Mulhern, 180 La. 627, 157 So.
370 (1934).
19. Hanby v. Texas Co., 140 La. 189, 72 So. 933 (1916); Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922); Wiley v. Davis,
164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928).
20. Wiley v. Davis, 164 La. 1090, 115 So. 280 (1928), wherein a lease
granted by the tutrix without authority from the probate judge, upon land
held in indivision with her minor children, was held null as to them. The
court said the granting of a mineral lease was the granting of a servitude on
property and constituted a dismemberment amounting to a partial alien-
ation.
21. 186 La. 190, 171 So. 846 (1936).
22. La. R.S. (1950) 9:1105: "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and con-
tracts applying to and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas,
and other minerals to possession, together with the rights, privileges, and
obligations resulting therefrom, are classified as real rights and incorporeal
immovable property .. " (Italics supplied.)
23. 195 La. 248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
24. 185 So. 88 (La. App. 1938).
25. La. R.S. (1950) 9:1105. La Act 6 of 1950 (2 E.S.), § 1, amending La. Act
205 of 1938, §§ 1, 2, added the concluding sentence: "This section shall be
considered substantive as well as procedural so that the owners of oil, gas
and other mineral leases and contracts within the purpose of this section
shall have the benefits of all laws relating to the owners of real rights in
immovable property or real estate." (Italics supplied.)
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appellant presented this question to the court, but the latter
declined to answer it since it was not then before the court. For
added perspective we might first examine the common law's
determination of this question. At common law the closest
approximation to the usufruct of the civil law is the life tenant.26
The general rule seems to be that the intention of the creator of
the life estate, as manifested by the instrument creating the estate,
is controlling in determining whether the life tenant is entitled
to the royalties accruing under mineral leases upon the estate.27
In the absence of such manifestation the question is settled under
either the open or unopened mine rule, that is, if the mine is
already opened the life tenant is entitled to the royalty, if not
then all that he is allowed is the interest therefrom.
28
In the civil law of Rome 2 9 the usufructuary was held not
entitled to open new mines since this would alter the character
of the property. However, when a mine was already opened, he
was allowed to work it and lease it. In this last case the minerals
were considered as fruit, the organic produce of the property,
and were apparently regarded as being capable of replenishment.
In Louisiana civil law, outside of the general article defining
usufruct,3 0 Article 552 of the Civil Code3 1 is probably the most
important in its bearing upon the question. The effect of this
article of course depends upon whether or not drilling an oil or
gas well is considered mining or quarrying.32 Another complica-
tion is the fact that the Louisiana courts have never passed upon
the question of when a mine or quarry is opened. Is it when the
lease is granted or does it become such with the first penetration
of the drill-bit into the earth?
The French counterpart of Article 552 is Article 598 of the
French Civil Code. Laurent,33 in commenting upon the article,
26. Daggett, Louisiana Mineral Rights 319 (rev. ed. 1949).
27. 18 A.L.R. 2d 104 (1951).
28. 18 A.L.R. 2d 106, 115 (1951).
29. Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law 101 (1936).
30. Art. 533, La. Civil Code of 1870.
31. Art. 552, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The usufructuary has a right to the
enjoyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the
usufruct, if they were actually worked before the commencement of the usu-
fruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries not opened."
32. See Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Murrell, 127 La. 466, 53 So. 705 (1910),
where the court held drilling operations not to be mining in the true sense.
Later decisions, however, classify drilling as mining. See Etchison Drilling
Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912); Rives v. Gulf Refining Co. of
La., 131 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
33. 6 Laurent, Principes de Droit Frangais 563, no 448 (2 ed. 1878).
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says, ". . . to be sure, the usufructuary enjoys like the proprietor,
but he enjoys the fruits, and not the capital. Now, the products
of mines and quarries are certainly not a friut, but a part of the
ground. It is therefore the substance of the thing which the
exploiter successively depletes." The Milling case is quite com-
patible with the first part of Laurent's comment, but is clearly
contrary to the latter part. It must be remembered that at the
time this mining and quarrying article was written, and for that
matter at the time of Roman law also, the methods of production
and exploitation were not developed to their present day state.
A mine or quarry, which was worked by hand, generally would
not be exhausted in the lifetime of men then living. Today an
oil deposit valued at hundreds of thousands or even millions of
dollars can be completely depleted in a relatively few years. The
theory that minerals are fruits of the earth is quite understand-
able and compatible with the methods that existed in the past.
However, in these days of high production drilling and mining,
the concept would no longer Seem to be valid.
Two other articles should be considered. Article 544 says
that the civil fruits produced by the thing subject to the usufruct
belong during its existence to the usufructuary. Article 545 de-
fines civil fruits as the "rents of real property." In light of the
Milling decision it would seem that the court in the future will
be forced to grant to the usufructuary the royalties from oil and
gas leases upor land subject to the usufruct. If this is a perfect
usufruct the naked owner would thereby be deprived of all this
revenue accruing from such leases during the time of the usufruct.
Wife's Separate Property. The Milling case also raises cer-
tain questions with respect to the paraphernal property of the
wife. Article 2385 of the Civil Code states that, "The paraphernal
property, which is not administered by the wife separately and
alone, is considered to be under the management of the husband."
This is followed by Article 2386, which states that unless the
wife records her intention to retain for herself the fruits of her
separate property, those fruits fall into the community of acquets
and gains . 4
Through ignorance or delay, a wife owning separate property
may fail to record her intention that the fruits therefrom shall
34. The necessity for the wife to record her intention to retain the fruits
from her separate property is brought out in K. & M. Store, Inc. v. Lewis,
22 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1945); Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue, 25 So. 2.4
547 (L. App. 1946),
1952]
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be retained by her alone. The husband by virtue of his power of
administration under Article 2385 could grant oil and gas leases
thereon. With the Milling case holding that royalty is a civil
fruit, the benefit from this lease would be thrown into the com-
munity by virtue. of Article 2386 and the husband would be
entitled to one-half thereof.
Possessor in Good Faith. Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that the products of the land belong to the good faith
possesor, and Article 3453 says that such a possessor "may gather
for his benefit the fruits of the thing until it is claimed by the
owner." (Italics supplied.) The word "products" in the former
article has been held to be synonymous with "fruits." 31 As men-
tioned, Elder v. Ellerbe held that the good faith possessor was not
entitled to retain the proceeds from oil and gas extracted during
his possession. In view of the direct holding in the instant
case that oil royalties are fruits, the continued validity of the
Ellerbe case would seem to be uncertain.
A comparison is made, in regard to the possessor in good
faith, between minerals and forest timber.a6 Heretofore they were
regarded in much the same manner. The important point is that
they were not regarded as "fruits of the soil" and hence the
possessor had to repay the owner for their removal.8 7
Depletion Allowance. The Revised Statutes of 195038 sets the
depletion allowance for oil and gas wells at 272 per cent of the
gross income. The significant factor to consider in relation to the
Milling case is the basis upon which the depletion is allowed.
This is simply that oil and gas are removed, whether it be by
virtue of sale or lease thereof, and there takes place a gradual
depletion of the taxpayer's capital investment in the property.
As was stated in the case of United States v. Ludey, the depletion
allowance "represents the reduction in the mineral content of the
reserve from which the product is taken." 39 This depletion
35. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F. 2d 834 (5th Cir.
1947); United States v. Iarang, 165 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1947).
36. See J. F. Ball & Bro. Lbr. Co. v. Simms Lbr. Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So.
674, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 244 (1908); Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
See also for comparative inclusion La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 21, and La.
R.S. (1950) 47:66.
37. Harang v. Bowie Lbr. Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919); Elder v.
Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
38. La. R.S. (1950) 47:158(C).
39. 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927). See also Walker v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 65 F. 2d 97 (5th Cir. 1933), certiorari denied, 290 U.S, 651 (1933);
Goldstein v, Comnissioner of Revenue, 290 U.4, 651 (1933),
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deduction is granted to every person who owns an economic inter-
est in the oil and gas40 and compensates for the day when all the
oil and gas will be exhausted. Even with this cursory examina-
tion of depletion the contrasting picture is plainly evident. The
rationale of the Milling case and the theory of depletion allow-
ance are clearly antithetical.
The Milling case seems to refute this idea of a diminishment
when it cites the Logan case saying that royalty is rent "in the
form of the produce of the land." 41 It would clearly appear that
royalty oil is not a product of the land, but a part of it which is
basic and will not be reproduced.
Conservation Act. The Milling case is based squarely on the
non-ownership theory. However, there is a possible qualification
of the strictness of that theory.
It is noted that when the Louisiana courts first began to deal
with matters of oil and gas, they were apparently very much
concerned with the alleged fugacity of oil and gas. 42 This early
regard for the volatile nature of the thing, with its comparison to
animals ferae naturae, was later dispelled by more scientifically
accurate investigations. 43
The point which might begin to compromise the strict posi-
tion of non-ownership is found in the conservation laws,44 where
repeated reference is made to the "pools" and "fields" of oil and
gas. This is expressive of an idea that is clearly at odds with one
of great fugacity. The picture that is conveyed by these words
is similar to that done by the words "vein" and "deposit," when
the latter are used in reference to a solid material. The words
"pool" and "field" clearly suggest dimension, position, and meas-
urability.
The effect of such a modification upon the doctrine of non-
ownership would be to cause a reconsideration of the effect of
the mineral lease of oil and gas. Any such modification of the
non-ownership theory would be to question whether an oil and
gas lease is simply a lease after all, and whether royalty is rent
under all circumstances.
40. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
41. 57 So. 2d 679, 682 (La. 1952).
42. See Frost-Johnson Lbr. Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
43. See Summers, Oil and Gas 4-10 (perm. ed. 1938).
44. La. R,S, (195q 30:1-638
1952]
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In addition to the considerations discussed, particularly those
relating to taxation, there are additional tax questions raised.
Unfortunately these are without the intended scope of this note,
and perhaps warrant individual treatment themselves.
In view of the well-known Ellerbe and Gray cases, it would
seem that the law on this phase of mineral rights was fairly well
settled. The instant decision is important as it relates to the
particular facts involved. More important, probably, is the effect
it may have on connected areas of law.
William C. Bradley
PROCEDURE-APPELLATE JURISDICTION, COURT OF APPEAL
Plaintiff brought suit to recover $25,025 for personal injuries
allegedly sustained from an assault and battery and from certain
defamatory statements. The district court rendered judgment
for defendant on the assault and battery charge and for the
plaintiff on the slander charge, and both appealed. Held, that
although slander is an offense separate and distinct from assault
and battery, since the former arose "out of the same circum-
stances" as the physical injuries, the court of appeal had appellate
jurisdiction over both claims for damages. The cases of Newsom
v. Starns and Applewhite v. New Orleans Great Northern Rail-
way Company were expressly overruled. Cavalier v. Original
Club Forrest, 56 So. 2d 147 (La. 1952).'
Article VII, Section 10, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
provides, "the Louisiana Supreme Court has appellate jurisdic-
tion in civil suits where the amount in dispute, or the fund to
be distributed, irrespective of the amount therein claimed, shall
exceed $2000 exclusive of interest, except in suits for damages
for physical injuries to or for the death of a person, or for other
damages sustained by such persons, or his heirs or representa-
1. The problem presented in the principal case arises only when separate
and distinct causes of action are joined in the same suit, and is attributable
primarily to the freedom of cumulation of actions permitted under Louisiana
procedure. Cf. Arts. 148-152, La. Code of Practice of 1870. If the two claims
are merely separate items of damages claimed for the same cause of action,
of necessity these separate items would arise "out of the same circum-
stances," that is, claim for property damage to plaintiff's automobile and a
claim for damages for physical injuries to plaintiff, resulting from the same
negligent acts of defendant. In such cases, clearly the appeal would lie to
the court of appeal.
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